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defense or prosecution will be considered in determining "significant
delay." To avoid confusion and possible reversals, more specific guidelines
must be given to trial courts for use in determining when supplemental voir
dire is required. Although problems remain to be solved, by requiring
supplemental voir dire after significant delays Price has increased the
possibility of a truly impartial jury.
Larry E. Reed

PROBATE-Independent Administration- Probate Court
Lacks Authority To Remove an Independent
Executor Adjudged Non Compos Mentis
Killgore v. Estate of Killgore,
568 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
Read Killgore was named independent executor in his mother's will.
Shortly after she died, Killgore was adjudged non compos mentis and a
temporary guardian was appointed for him. Two months later, the probate
court entered an order admitting the will to probate and authorizing issuance of letters testamentary. Killgore was named by the court to serve as
independent executor without bond. Subsequently, the court removed
Killgore as independent executor on the ground of mental incompetence
and appointed another as temporary administrator. Killgore appealed to
the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals on the ground that the probate
court erred in cancelling his letters testamentary, thus removing him as
independent executor of his mother's estate. Held-Reversed. A probate
court lacks authority to remove an independent executor even though he
has been adjudged non compos mentis.1
The concept of independent administration was first codified in 1843
when the Seventh Congress of the Republic of Texas gave a testator the
right to provide "that no other action than the probate and registration of
the will . . . shall be had in the Probate Courts."' 3 This concept is closely
analogous to that of the Roman "instituted heir."' Under the civil law of
1. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ). Killgore was ordered reinstated as independent executor of his mother's estate.
d. at 183.
2. See 45 TEXAS L. REv. 352, 352 (1966).
3. 1843 Tex. Gen. Laws, An Act to Amend the Probate Law §5, at 14, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAws
OF TEXAS 834 (1898). See Comment, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33
TEXAS L. Rv. 95, 97 (1954).
4. See Comment, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEXAS L. REV.
95, 98 (1954). In Roman law, the appointment of an instituted heir was necessary to the
legality and existence of the will. The instituted heir assumed the legal position of the
testator, and had to be named before the testator could make any dispositions of his estate.
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Rome, the entire estate of a testator was distributed among the legatees;
the instituted heir's only duty was to collect and distribute the estate, and
his affirmative actions were not subject to judicial authority.' The origins
of the independent executor are thus firmly rooted in civil rather than
common law.' Indeed, the state's first legislators were so committed to the
civil law concept of freedom from judicial supervision that only minimal
restrictions were placed upon the powers and duties of independent executors.7
Early interpretations by Texas courts of the authority of the independent executor established that one acting under the power of a will could
do so without interference from the probate court, so long as the duties
were faithfully and actively performed.8 This concept was further extended
in Roy v. Whitaker,' in which the supreme court held that the authority
of the probate court did not extend over an independent executor in matters regarding settlement of an estate. 0 The intention of the courts in so
construing the concept of independent administration has been to permit
an executor "to effect the distribution of an estate with a minimum of cost
and delay."" Nevertheless, the Probate Code provides that if the independent executor is shown to be mismanaging the property or has become
disqualified, he can be required by the probate court to post a bond. By
judicial decision, the failure of the independent executor to post such bond
Since the instituted heir assumed the legal position of his testator, he was free to make
distributions of his inherited portion of the estate as he wished. A. PRICHARD, LEAGE'S ROMAN
PRIVATE LAw 260-262 (3d ed. 1961).
5. See Comment, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEXAS L. REv.
95, 98 (1954).
6. Cf. Thompson v. Duncan, 1 Tex. 485, 488 (1846)(judicially recognizing influence of
civil law upon early Texas probate legislation).
7. See Woodward, Independent Administration Under the New Texas ProbateCode, 34
TExAs L. Rev. 687, 687 (1956). The common law concept of administration, on the other hand,
dictates that the personal representative of the decedent is subject to the will and direction
of the court as an extension of the sovereign's protection over all of its subjects. See generally
Comment, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 95, 95-96
(1954).
8. See Lumpkin v. Smith, 62 Tex. 249, 251 (1884); Holmes v. Johns, 56 Tex. 41, 51
(1881).
9. 92 Tex. 346, 48 S.W. 892 (1898), modified, 92 Tex. 357, 49 S.W. 367 (1899).
10. See id. at 355, 48 S.W. at 896. The court stated in dicta, however, that under certain
conditions, "the settlement of it could . . . be resumed in case the trust [confided in the
executor] should lapse by the failure of the executor to discharge his duties, or from other
causes." Id. at 352, 48 S.W. at 895.
11. Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 444 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. 1969);
accord, In re Bateman, 528 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). See
also Comment, Independent Administration of Decedents' Estates, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 95, 9697 (1954).
12. TEx. PROS. CODE ANN. § 149 (Vernon 1956); see Cocke v. Smith, 142 Tex. 396, 401,
179 S.W.2d 954, 957 (1944); Perkins v. Wood, 63 Tex. 396, 399 (1885); Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d
605, 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss3/16

2

Jones: Probate Court Lacks Authority to Remove an Independent Executor A

1979]

CASE NOTES

remains the only basis for his removal under the present Code. 3
While the intent of successive Probate Code statutes has been to liberate
the independent executor from control by the probate court," it was assumed under the old Code that minority and insanity were without question sufficient to disqualify independent executors.'" Indeed, early Texas
decisions held that an independent executor was required to be of sound
mind.'I In the present Code, incompetents are specifically prohibited from
serving as "an executor or administrator."' 7 After 1957, however, when the
limitation of Roy v. Whitaker" was included in the statutory language of
the Code,'" the right of removal of an independent executor once he had
been appointed became- uncertain .20 In the present Code, section 3(aa),
while grouping independent executors within the definition of "personal
representative," excludes independent executors from the control of the
probate court in matters regarding settlement of the estate except as expressly provided by law.' Section 145(h) provides that after an independent executor has been appointed and the inventory, appraisement, and
list of claims approved, no further action can be had by the county court
2
unless "specifically and explicitly" authorized by the Probate Code. 1
Bell v. Still" was the first court of civil appeals review of the 1955
Probate Code revisions. The Waco court, confronted with the issue whether
13. See Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 444 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex.
1969); Metting v. Metting, 431 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ);
Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), affl'd, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
1966); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 320 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ
dism'd).
14. In re Bateman, 528 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ re'd n.r.e.).
15. See Cocke v. Smith, 142 Tex. 396, 400, 179 S.W.2d 954, 956 (1944); Journeay v.
Shook, 105 Tex. 551, 556, 152 S.W. 809, 812 (1913); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 3353 (1948). See
generally Woodward, Independent Administrations Under the New Texas Probate Code, 34
TExAs L. REv. 687, 692 (1956).
16. See Journeay v. Shook, 105 Tex. 551, 556, 152 S.W. 809, 812 (1913); Stevens v.
Cameron, 100 Tex. 515, 517, 101 S.W. 791, 792 (1907).
17. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) states in pertinent part: "No
person is qualified to serve as an executor or administrator who is: . . . An incompetent
18. 92 Tex. 346, 48 S.W. 892 (1898), modified, 92 Tex. 357, 49 S.W. 367 (1899).
"[E]xcept to those articles which relate to ... settlement of an estate, the term 'executors,'
as used in our statutes, includes independent as well as other executors." Id. at 355, 48 S.W.
at 896.
19. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(aa)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) states: "'Personal representative' or 'Representative' includes .

.

. independent executor ....

The inclusion of

independent executors herein shall not be held to subject such representatives to control of
the courts in probate matters with respect to settlement of estates except as expressly provided by law."
20. As one commentator has written, "[A] testator is free to appoint a three-year-old
idiot child as his independent executor .

. . ."

Woodward, Independent Administrations

Under the New Texas Probate Code, 34 TExAs L. REv. 687, 692 (1956).
21. See TEX. PRoo. CODE ANN. § 3(aa)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
22. See id. § 145(h).
23. 389 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966),
noted in 45 TExAs L. REv. 352 (1966).
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an independent executor could be removed for alleged mismanagement,
was called upon to construe certain relevant sections of the Probate Code.24
The court held that a probate court had no jurisdiction to directly remove
an independent executor for mismanagement and malfeasance", The
amendments were held to have established two tests for determining the
power of a probate court to remove an independent executor: first, whether
the removal of an independent executor requires the probate court to take
action in connection with the settlement of the estate, and second, whether
the Code specifically provides for this action in the probate court." The
court considered both the amended section 3(aa), which groups independent executors with other personal representatives except with respect to
matters regarding settlement of the estate, and section 145, which limits
probate court action in independent administration. Finding these two
sections to be in pari materia, the court concluded that when action was
instituted in the probate court regarding settlement of the estate, if that
action involved an independent executor, it must be "specifically and
explicitly" authorized." 2Although section 222 concerns the removal of
"personal representatives," the court was compelled to apply its interpretation of sections 3(aa) and 145. Because section 222 does not "specifically
and explicitly" apply to independent executors, the probate court was
prohibited from removing them. The Texas Supreme Court adopted the
Waco opinion, noting that the Probate Code had not changed the preexisting rule that allowed removal only after the independent executor had been
required to post bond and failed to do so.10 Bell v. Still has since been cited
in a number of decisions as establishing the rule that, unless there has been
a failure to post bond, the probate court has no authority to remove an
independent executor for mismanagement or malfeasance."2
In Killgore v.Estate of Killgore" the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals
24. Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d
353 (Tex. 1966) (construing predecessors of sections 3(aa), 145(h), and 222 of present Probate
Code).
25. See id. at 607.
26. Id. at 606.
27. Id. at 606; see TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 3(aa), 145(h) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
28. Tzx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
29. See Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff d, 403 S.W.2d
353 (Tex. 1966); 45 TExAs L. Rav. 352, 354 (1966).
30. See Bell v. Still, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966). The Supreme Court noted:
[Tihe matter is a difficult one because doubts exist as to the wisdom of such a policy
under which an independent executor, accused of gross mismanagement of an estate,
is not subject to removal by the probate court as any other executor or administrator.
This, however, is a matter within the control of the Legislature.
Id. at 353.
31. See Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 444 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex.
1969); In re Bateman, 528 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.);

Metting v. Metting, 431 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ).
32. 568 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
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was confronted with the question whether a probate court was empowered
by the Probate Code to remove an independent executor who had been
adjudged non compos mentis. The San Antonio court referred to Bell v.
Still and chose to apply the tests developed by the Waco court.3 The
Killgore majority found that section 222 did not meet the second test
because it did not specifically provide for removal of an independent executor." In reaching this decision the San Antonio court seemed to require
that both tests set out in Bell be met.3" Thus, the court never inquired
whether the first test was met: whether removal of an incompetent independent executor involved matters regarding settlement of the estate .31 At
the end of its opinion the court expressed serious reservations about its
decision.3 7

In a strongly worded dissent, Chief Justice Cadena argued that in light
of the distinctive facts of Bell v. Still, the majority erred in its application.
Justice Cadena restated the Bell tests: if action does involve settlement of
the estate a specific provision is indeed required.u He argued that since
removal of an incompetent does not involve settlement of the estate, removal may be accomplished without a specific provision. 3' Thus, if the
probate court is allowed to remove an incompetent pursuant to section 222,
no conflict with Bell exists."0 His conclusion, then, was that section 222
applies to independent executors and authorizes removal for incompetency." The Chief Justice further sought to weaken the effect of section 145
with his argument that the established practice of requiring an independent executor to give bond for mismanagement surely necessitates inquiry
into matters concerning settlement of the estate and allows to be done
indirectly what may not be done directly.2
The majority in Killgore failed to distinguish the facts giving rise to the
desired removal of the executor in Killgore from the situation in Bell.' 3 In
33. Id. at 183; see Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd,
403 S.W.2d 353 (1966).

34. Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ).

35. See id. at 183.
36. See id. at 183.
37. "The fact that the probate court cannot remove an incompetent independent executor is of doubtful wisdom." Id. at 183.
38. See id. at 185 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 187 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 187 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 187 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 187 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).

43. See id. at 184 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting). Compare id. at 182 (single question is
jurisdiction of probate court to remove incompetent independent executor) with Bell v. Still,
389 S.W.2d 605, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), affl'd, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966)(single

question is jurisdiction of probate court to remove independent executor accused of mismanagement and malfeasance).
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Bell the independent executor was accused of mismanagement." The Bell
opinion was limited to examining whether the probate court had jurisdiction to inquire into the manner in which the executor was settling the
estate.' The Texas Supreme Court was concerned with maintaining the
autonomy of the independent executor when it affirmed Bell." On the
other hand, Killgore concerned the competency of an independent executor
who had been adjudged incompetent to manage even his own affairs.47
Although the independent executor Was not legally capable, by statute, of
managing property,4" the Killgore majority determined that the probate
court had no jurisdiction to remove him." A totally different interpretation
of the Bell v. Still tests from that applied by the Kiligore majority could
be reached without disrupting the balance between the policy underlying
autonomous administration and the need for competence in independent
administration. 0 The Killgore dissent views the Bell opinion as requiring
only that when the probate court is about to take any action which touches
upon settlement of the estate, that action must be specifically and explicitly provided for in the Code.5' This interpretation is justified not only by
the language of Bell, but also by the context of the case-a charge of
mismanagement."2 When removal of a mentally incompetent independent
executor is sought the authority of the probate court should be broader.
Since a mental incompetent has no capacity to manage property, 5' his
removal does not concern settlement of the estate. 5 Consequently, the
Code need not "specifically and explicitly" provide for such action; although section 222 does not expressly apply to independent executors, it
is sufficient authorization for their removal. 5
44. See Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 606-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403
S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966).
45. See id. at 606.
46. See Bell v. Still, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966). See generally 45 TEXAS L. REv. 352,
354-55 (1966).
47. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182,182 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ).
. 48. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(y)(Vernon 1956). "'Persons of unsound mind' are
persons non compos mentis, idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and other persons who are
mentally incompetent to care for themselves or to manage their property and financial affairs." Id.
49. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182,183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ).
50. See id. at 184-85 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 185 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting); Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. Civ.
App.'-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966).
52. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182,185 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ)(Cadena, C.J., dissenting); Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 605 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966).
53. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(y)(Vernon 1956).
54. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ)(Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 187 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting); TEx. PROR. CODE ANN. § 222 (Vernon Supp.
1978-1979).
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Texas courts have deferred to the legislative policy of non-interference

with the actions of independent executors while settling the estate." Probate courts are generally prohibited from removing the independent executor because removal allows the probate court to accomplish "by obliquity
what is prohibited to be done directly."5 Yet, it is now settled that a
district court, through the exercise of its general equitable powers, can
appoint a receiver to take control of an estate being administered by an
independent executor in cases in which proof has been made of mismanagement or squandering, even though the independent executor has not
first refused to post bond.58 Although the result of the proceedings is to
remove the independent- executor, the court's order deletes as "duplicative
and unnecessary" language that would state that the independent executor
is being removed. 5' The probate court is prohibited from taking similar
action for the protection of the estate." It is incongruous that the probate
court which takes direct action by removing an independent executor is
accused of "obliquity,"' while a district court, which takes the identical
action, but deletes the use of a few words in its decree, faces no such
criticism." If one assumes, as does the Killgore dissent, that inquiry into
.the competency of an independent executor who has been adjudged an
incompetent in a separate proceeding" requires no examination by the

probate court into the manner in which the executor settles the estate,"4

legislative intent is not compromised.
The majority opinion in Kiligore, although following precedent in refus56. See Bell v. Still, 403 S.W.2d 353, 353 (Tex. 1966).
57. See Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d
353 (Tex. 1966).
58. See, e.g., Stanley v. Henderson, 139 Tex. 160, 164-65, 162 S,W.2d 95, 97-98 (1942);
Metting v. Metting, 431 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ);
O'Connor v. O'Connor, 320 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ dism'd); cf.
Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2293 (Vernon 1971)(receivership available as action between
partners or others jointly interested in property or fund when danger of injury proven).
59. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 320 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ
dism'd).
60. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ); Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605,'607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403
S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966).
61. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 185-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1978, no Writ)(Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
62. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 320 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ
dism'd); see Metting v. Metting, 431 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968,
no writ).
63. Approximately three and one-half months prior to Read Killgore's appointment as
independent executor of the estate he had been adjudged non compos mentis. See Killgore
v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ). Under
the Probate Code, Killgore was disqualified from serving as an independent executor prior to
his appointment. See TEx. NOs. CODE ANN. § 78 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
64. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182,186 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ)(Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
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ing to permit affirmative inquiry into the handling of the estate,' failed
to consider the ramifications of allowing one adjudged incompetent to
independently administer an estate."6 Persons non compos mentis are mentally and legally incompetent to manage their property or financial affairs; "7 they must be incompetent therefore to manage the affairs of another
by serving as an executor.' Several jurisdictions, including Texas, have
concluded that one who is incompetent lacks the ability to transact business,"9 or contract./' The intent of a testator who appoints a "trustee" to
"manage" the affairs of his estate is not given effect when that person is
allowed to transact business which he is not legally competent to perform,"
particularly when the Probate Code specifically states that incompetents
are not capable of managing their own affairs or transacting business."
The Texas legislature could easily lift a burden from the state courts by
expressly providing for the removal of independent executors who are not
mentally competent to manage the affairs of the estate.7" The legislature
of the state of Washington, with a probate code which reflects a concept
of independent administration akin to that of Texas, 4 has provided statu65. See, e.g., Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 444 S.W.2d 632, 634
(Tex. 1969); Roy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 346, 355, 48 S.W. 892, 896 (1898), modified, 92 Tex.
357, 49 S.W. 367 (1899); Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605,607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), affd,
403 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1966).
66. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ)(Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
67. TEx. PROB. CoDE ANN. § 3(y)(Vernon 1956). See also Judd v. Aiken, 497 S.W.2d
632, 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lowery v. Lowery, 386 S.W.2d
194, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, no writ).
68. See TEx. PROS. CODE ANN. § 78(b)(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
69. See, e.g., Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9, 103 (1862); In re Prince's Guardianship, 379
P.2d 845, 847 (Okla. 1963); Lowery v. Lowery, 386 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1965, no writ); Rattner v. Kleiman, 36 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1931,
no writ).
70. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Bramlett, 140 So. 752, 754 (Ala. 1932); In re
Easton, 133 A.2d 441, 447 (Md. 1957); Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Podvin, 89 A.2d 672, 676
(N.J. 1952). In Texas, the contracts of an incompetent are voidable. See, e.g., Williams v.
Sapieha, 94 Tex. 430, 436, 61 S.W. 115, 118 (1901); Gaston v. Copeland, 335 S.W.2d 406, 409
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Neal v. Holt, 69 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1934, writ ref'd). See generally R-sTATEmFNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §18(c)
(1973).
71. See TEx. PROS. CODE ANN. § 78(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). Compare Roy v.
Whitaker, 92 Tex. 346, 356, 48 S.W. 892, 897 (1898), modified, 92 Tex. 357, 49 S.W. 67 (1899)
(independent executor serves as trustee of his testator) with Killgore v. Estate of Killgore,
568 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ) (Cadena, C.J., dissenting)
(incompetent independent executor lacks legal capacity to serve).
72. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(y) (Vernon 1956).
73. Cf. Bell v. Still, 403 S.W.2d 353, 353 (Tex. 1966) (probate court intervention is matter
properly within control of legislature). See generally Comment, Removal of Independent
Executors in Texas, 8 Hous. L. Rav. 895 (1971); 45 TExAs L. REv. 352, 352-54 (1966).
74. Compare TEx. PROD. CODE ANN. § 145 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) (estate may be
represented by independent executor) with WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.68.010 (Supp. 1977)
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tory authority for the removal of an administrator who has later been
adjudged incompetent. 5 Texas legislators enacted section 78 to prevent
incompetents from assuming the role of an independent executor;76 however, they have failed to provide a provision which allows the probate court
to remove incompetent independent executors once appointed." Perhaps
the Washington legislators had the foresight to realize that a bonding
procedure, even if a bonding company was willing to assume such a risk
with an incompetent individual, would not provide any appreciable measure of protection to the legatees," thus leaving a wrong without a remedy.
It is curious that courts have continued to insist on a bonding procedure
before allowing a probate court to remove an independent executor. Bonding is an inadequate procedure even for a competent independent executor.
Once the bond is given the independent executor can continue to misuse
funds or delay the settlement of the estate for his own purposes" with the
probate court powerless to impose any further sanctions upon the selfdealing independent executor. 0 Even less protection is provided for the
legatees of an estate when the executor is incompetent, since no responsible bonding company, under the dictates of common sense, would ever
assume substantial financial risk for an incompetent." Although a failure
on the part of the independent executor to obtain a bond will enable the
probate court to remove him, it places the legatees in the hazardous position of being forced to pursue the independent executor through the process, while the estate may be severely depleted in the meantime. 2 Texas
(estate may be represented by "administration under a non-intervention will"). See generally
Fletcher, Washington's Non-Intervention Executor-Starting Point for Probate
Simplification, 41 WASH. L. REv. 33 (1966); see also 45 TEXAs L. REV. 352, 352 (1966).
75. WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 11.28.250 (1967) states, "Whenever the court has reason
to believe that any personal representative. . . is incompetent to act. . . it shall have power
and authority, after notice and hearing to revoke such letters."
76. See Tzx. PRos. CODE ANN. § 78(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). The San Antonio Court
of Civil Appeals did not address the fact that Read Killgore was incompetent prior to his
appointment as independent executor, and therefore did not discuss the effect of section
78(b). See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ).
77. Cf. Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ) (jurisdiction to remove independent executor must come from legislature); Bell
v. Still, 403 S.W.2d 353, 353 (Tex. 1966) (legislature must authorize removal).
78. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182,187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ) (Cadena, C.J., dissenting); 45 TEXAs L. Rav. 352, 356 (1966). See generally
Comment, Removal of Independent Executors in Texas, 8 Hous. L. Rav. 895, 905-09 (1971).
79. See 45 TEXAS L. Rav. 352, 356 nn. 33 & 34 (1966). See generally Comment, Self
Dealing by Fiduciaries-A Texas Survey, 39 TEXAS L. Rav. 330, 331-32 (1961).
80. See Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Alice Nat'l Bank, 444 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex.
1969); Bell v. Still, 389 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965), aff'd, 403 S.W.2d 353
(Tex. 1966).
81. Cf. Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ) (Cadena, C.J., dissenting). See generally Comment, Removal of Independent
Executors in Texas, 8 Hous. L. REv. 895, 905-09 (1971).
82. See 45 TEXAs L. Rav. 352, 356. See generally Comment, Removal of Independent
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legislators could end this meaningless process by enacting a statute which
would allow Texas probate courts to extend protection to estates in the
hands of an incompetent independent executor. 3
Although it is clear that the majority opinion in Kiligore was founded
on the court's reluctance to diverge from prior case law and its perception

of legislative intent, 4 the rights of testators in Texas may have been seriously damaged. A testator who places his confidence in an individual
whom
he expects will serve his interests after his death most likely
assumes

that individual will remain competent throughout the distribution of the

estate. While the testator has no need of a remedy from the courts should
his independent executor become incompetent, the legatees certainly do.
The testator has trusted that his independent executor will properly manage the affairs of the estate as the latter sees fit;" he must certainly have

assumed that his executor would have the competence to determine what
must be settled. 6 Bell gave a competent independent executor discretion
to make mistakes, since the testator apparently had sufficient confidence
in the executor's abilities. Killgore gives free rein to an incompetent."7
Killgore v. Estate of Killgore dramatizes the need for the legislature to
decide whether it is fair to the citizens of Texas to allow an independent
executor who has been adjudged incompetent after the testator's death, to

remain at the helm of the estate. With the added weight of Killgore, it
should be evident to the legislature that Texas courts will not extend the
authority of the probate Courts beyond the strict letter of the law." It is
necessary now, therefore, for the legislature to clearly express its intent
and to define the "spirit" of that law. The probate court should have the
Executors in Texas, 8 Hous. L. REv. 895, 905-09 (1971).
83. Cf. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § f1.28.250 (1967) (courts may remove personal representative who is incompetent). The Texas courts have expressed deference to the legislature in this matter. See Bell v. Still, 403 S.W.2d 353, 353 (Tex. 1966) (legislature should
resolve removal of an independent executor); Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182,
183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ) (legislature must resolve "doubtful wisdom"
of policy prohibiting removal of incompetent independent executor). But cf. Fletcher,
Washington's Non-Intervention Executor-Starting Point for Probate Simplification, 41
WASH. L. REv. 33, 74-92 (1966) (Washington courts have retained too much authority to
interfere in "administration under a non-intervention will").
84. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ).
85. Compare Roy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 346, 356, 48 S.W.'892, 897 (1898), modified, 92
Tex. 357, 49 S.W. 367 (1899) (independent executor is trustee of his testator) with In re
Leland's Will, 114 N.E. 854,'856 (N.Y. 1916) (incompetent executor summarily denied
letters testamentary for inability to fulfill trust).
86. Cf. Roy v. Whitaker, 92 Tex. 346, 355, 48 S.W. 892, 896 (1898), modified, 92 Tex.
357, 49 S.W. 367 (1899) (describing legal authority of independent executor to settle various
matters of estate).
87. See Killgore v. Estate of Killgore, 568 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ).
88. See id. at 184; Bell v. Still, 403 SW.2d 353, 353 (Tex. 1966).
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